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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the linkages between a large array of in-
stitutional arrangements (on product, labour and financial markets) and employ-
ment performance. Our analysis includes unemployment, inactivity and jobless rates,
thus allowing us to control for possible substitution eﬀects across situations of non-
employment and to check whether institutional rigidities aﬀecting unemployment
impact inactivity along the same line. To cope with common problems related to the
inclusion of time-invariant institutional variables in fixed eﬀects models, we present
results of regressions based on three diﬀerent estimators: PCSE, GLS and FEVD,
the last one being a new procedure specifically designed to treat slowly changing
variables. New institutional series are proposed, namely to account for unemploy-
ment insurance net replacement rates and employment protection legislation (EPL).
Among other results, we find strong evidence of a positive eﬀect of EPL on employ-
ment performance as well as of possible complementarities across product and labour
markets regulation.
JEL classification: E24, J21
Keywords: unemployment, inactivity, institutions, time-invariant variables
1 Introduction
This paper aims to take a new look at the ’old’ problem of European unemployment,
by analyzing the institutional and macroeconomic determinants of joblessness and its
components, i.e. unemployment and inactivity, for 18 OECD countries over the 1980-
2004 period.
There is a large body of empirical and theoretical contributions in economics studying
the impact of institutional arrangements on the operation of labour markets and on em-
ployment performance. The focus of the economic literature has shifted over time from
the "corporatism" view of the ’80 (Calmfors and Driﬃll, 1988) to the "markets regula-
tion" view of the ’90 (Nickell, 1997 and Siebert, 1997). While the "corporatism" view
emphasized the positive impact of specific institutional arrangements - such as the degree
of coordination in wage bargaining -, the more recent literature on "markets regulation"
posits that the strength of institutional imperfections in European labour markets hinders
the proper functioning of these markets, making them ’inflexible’. The subsequent policy
recommendations are to remove obstacles to flexibility: decrease unemployment benefits,
abolish job protection legislation, increase mobility of labour, improve product market
competition (IMF, 2003 and OECD, 1997).
A few theoretical papers have argued that removing obstacles to a flexible labour mar-
ket may be more complicated because the various sources of rigidity are complementary
∗University of Paris X and PSE (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques)
†University of Rotterdam
‡University of Lyon 2, PSE (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques) and IZA. The authors wish to
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to each other (Coe and Snower, 1997; Orszag and Snower, 1999; Saint Paul, 2003). Recent
contributions have also pointed out the existence of interaction eﬀects between product
and labour markets institutions (Amable and Gatti, 2006; Blanchard, 2005; Blanchard
and Giavazzi, 2003; Koeniger and Vindigni, 2003) as well as labour and financial markets
imperfections (Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Acemoglu, 2001).1 Moreover, deregulation may
in some cases yields perverse eﬀects on employment: Amable and Gatti [2004] develop
a dynamic eﬃciency wage framework where deregulation in product and labour markets
boosts labour turnover and reduces job security; this mechanism pushes the incentive com-
patible real wage schedule upwards and may thus generate employment losses. Finally,
recent papers have focused on the consequences of deregulation on wages disparities and
employment opportunities for marginal workers. Schmitt and Wadsworth [2002] consider
that deregulation does not necessary yields better employment opportunities for those
marginal categories: greater wage disparities might be associated with greater inactivity
for marginal workers, in which case more flexible wage adjustments would not be suﬃ-
cient to avoid quantity adjustment (through inactivity). As a consequence, the standard
deregulation view should be analysed against its implication for inactivity and joblessness
as well (Faggio and Nickell, 2005; Bicakova, 2005).
A large body of literature has tested the strength of the empirical link between vari-
ous institutional features representative of European labour markets, such as employment
protection, the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining or union coverage, and the
level of unemployment. Taking the recent literature for instance, Nickell [1997] considers
the influence of employment protection, the unemployment replacement rate, unemploy-
ment benefit duration, the relative spending on active labour market policy, union density,
union coverage, a measure of bargaining coordination and the total tax rate on unemploy-
ment. If employment protection is shown to have no eﬀect, the other results confirm the
expectations: active labour market policy and bargaining coordination decrease unem-
ployment while the other institutions raise the rate of unemployment. Elmeskov, Martin
and Scarpetta [1998]’s results diﬀer from those of Nickell [1997] to the extent that they
find a significant (positive) eﬀect of employment protection on unemployment, but no
eﬀect of union density. Belot and Van Ours [2004] consider the eﬀects of interaction be-
tween several institutional variables and distinguish between models with and without
fixed eﬀects. When the latter are introduced, all institutional variables turn non signifi-
cant. When they are omitted, the tax rate, replacement rate and union density variables
are significantly positively correlated to unemployment, but the coeﬃcients for the wage
coordination and employment protection variables are significantly negative. The results
concerning the interaction eﬀects are for the most part inconclusive.
Nickel et al. [2005] use annual data and estimate a fixed eﬀects model with lagged de-
pendent variable. The authors find a significantly positive influence of the unemployment
benefit replacement rate, benefit duration and the tax variable density on unemploy-
ment, a significantly negative eﬀect of wage coordination, but no significant influence of
employment protection or union density. Control variables include various measures of
macroeconomic shocks, which turn out to have significant coeﬃcients. What comes out
of the estimations is that half of the rise in unemployment between the 1960s and the
1990s can be explained by macroeconomic factors, the other half depends on institutional
variables concerning the labour market. The assessment of the eﬀect of institutional vari-
ables independently of macroeconomic factors is made more complex if the two types of
influences interact with each other. This issue is tackled in Blanchard and Wolfers [2000].
According to their results, labour market institutions produce high unemployment only
in interaction with macroeconomic shocks. However, their findings are very sensitive to
changes in specifications, and the use of time-varying institutional variables considerably
weaken their results.
The basic results of the orthodox view may be summarised as follows (Baker et al.,
2005): the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), the unemployment replacement
1More details about theoretical channels of interactions across institutional arrangements on diﬀerent
markets will be given in the next Section below.
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rate, the unemployment benefit duration and the tax rate influence positively the rate of
unemployment whereas active labour market policy and wage coordination influence it
negatively. The evidence supporting the standard view that labour markets deregulation
yields a positive impact on employment is, however, seemingly not conclusive. Bertola
[1990] shows that labour market regulation (i.e. job protection) may contribute to improve
employment trough wage moderation. More recently, a few papers such Freeman [2005],
Baker et al. [2004] and [2005] challenge the robustness of the empirical findings on macro
data pointing labour market institutions as responsible for a high and persistent level
of unemployment. Expanding the time period used until the late 1990s, Baker et al.
[2004]’s regressions show either no significant influence of institutional variables such as
employment protection, union density or the tax wedge. They even find counter-intuitive
eﬀects of the unemployment replacement ratio. The conclusion is that existing empirical
results oﬀer no compelling evidence linking labour markets institutions to unemployment:
existing estimations are very sensitive to changes in the equations specification and the
selection of explanatory variables is often biased.
Lack of solid results concerning the influence of employment institutions alone has
led researchers to look for influences beyond the labour market. Empirical results on
the consequences of joint product and labour markets deregulation are provided in a few
contributions such as Boeri et al. [2000] and Nicoletti et al. [2000]. These papers make
use of OECD variables capturing the intensity and strength of regulation in product and
labour markets. These indexes prove to be strongly correlated, thus suggesting the exis-
tence of an interdependency between the two policy dimensions. Nicoletti and Scarpetta
[2002] tackle the issue of whether the inclusion of measures of Product Market Regulation
(PMR) strengthen or weaken the evidence linking labor market institutions to employ-
ment.2 They test this hypothesis with a series of cross-country time series regressions
for 1982-1998 including product market regulation variables in addition to labour market
variables. When PMR variables are excluded, they find no relationship between the size of
the tax wedge and the employment rate. The relationship becomes significantly negative
when PMR measures are included in the regressions, but the replacement rate variable
is not always significant. The union density and EPL variables are both significant in all
the regressions. In a more recent paper (Nicoletti and Scarpetta [2005]) the two authors
explore the issue of complementarities across product and labour markets and find some
evidence supporting the idea that employment gains by deregulating product markets
are stronger in highly regulated countries, i.e. countries that have rigid labour markets.
Kugler and Pica [2003] show, on Italian data, that a tighter entry regulation hampers the
gains associated with labour market deregulation.
The aim of this paper is to provide some new evidence on the linkages between the
supposedly rigidity of a large array of institutional arrangements (on product, labour
and financial markets) and employment performance. Our estimation strategy is largely
inspired by Nickel et al. [2005]: we use annual data and estimate fixed eﬀects models
with lagged dependent variable. However, our dependent variables (measuring employ-
ment performance) include the unemployment rate as well as the rates of non-employment
(joblessness) and inactivity. The reason for including jobless and inactivity rates in our
analysis is that there is some evidence of international diﬀerences in participation rates.
Indeed, one way to decrease unemployment figures is to remove people from the active
labour force. Bicakova [2005] studies prime age men status on the labour market in the
United-States, United-Kingdom and France and shows that, for this category of work-
ers, inactivity in the United-States and United-Kingdom is greater than unemployment,
whereas the reverse holds for France. A bunch of other papers focus on the question of
inactivity among prime age men (see, among others, Murphy and Topel, 1997; Faggio and
Nickell, 2005). Our analysis diﬀers from the above in that we consider a panel of 18 coun-
tries and study unemployment and inactivity for the whole working age population; we
will nevertheless come back to prime age men in a specific Section of the paper. Extend-
ing our empirical analysis to inactivity will allow us to control for possible substitution
2They use the non agricultural employment rate as dependent variable.
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eﬀects across the diﬀerent situations of non-employment and check whether institutional
rigidities aﬀecting unemployment impact the inactivity rate along the same line.
Including institutional variables in estimations rises a well-known problem of consis-
tently estimating time-invariant variables within the framework of fixed eﬀect models. We
cope with this issue in two diﬀerent ways: first, we adopt a specific estimation technique
designed to improve estimations of time-invariant or slowly changing variables; second, we
construct a new indicator of EPL based on annual ’observations’ of reforms (see below).
Our estimation technique relies on a new procedure proposed by Plümper and Tröger
[2004], which takes three steps: (i) estimate a fixed-eﬀects model (ii) regress the unit
eﬀects on the time-invariant variables (iii) re-estimate the first stage including the error
term of the second stage (FEVD estimator). Concerning employment protection legisla-
tion, we take as a starting point the OECD EPL indicators that are now available for
three dates: end of the 1980s, end of the 1990s and 2003. Based on this indicator and
on previous works by Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] as well as Nickell et al. [2002], we
construct our own annual series by exploiting information included in the FRDB Social
Reforms Database, which collects annual data about social reforms in European coun-
tries over the period 1987-2005 in the several areas among which employment protection
legislation.
Contrary to existing studies, we make use of the unemployment benefit entitlement
variable that has recently been proposed by Allan and Scruggs (2004) and made available
by Scruggs (2004): net-replacement-rates of unemployment insurance, i.e. the percentage
of foregone earnings replaced by this insurance, net of taxes and other charges. This
variable proves to be far more precise than the gross replacement rates proposed by
the OECD. We also include in our regressions the OECD indicator of product market
regulation to account for the impact of product market competition on employment,
stressed in the recent theoretical literature. In the same line, our estimations aim at
providing some evidence about interactions eﬀects across labour and product markets
imperfections often neglected in the empirical literature. Moreover, we include measures
of credit constraint, central bank independence and financialisation of the economies as
proxies allowing us to control for financial market imperfections.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next Section we present the background
for our estimations: first, we review the main theoretical arguments enlightening the ex-
pected impact of institutional and macroeconomic features on employment performance;
second, we describe our database and selected variables; finally, we give more details about
our estimation technique. In Section 3, we present our empirical results for unemploy-
ment, joblessness and inactivity, based on PCSE, GLS and FEVD estimations. Section 4
present a few extensions to our basic estimations: we analyse the eﬀect of education on
employment performance and subsequently disaggregate inactivity, unemployment and
joblessness series to study more specifically the male population aged from 25 to 54.
Conclusive remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Analysing unemployment and inactivity
Unemployment and inactivity are strictly connected issues. Statistical definitions produce
a sharp divide between the unemployed and the economically inactive, but in reality one
should consider all those without work as being on a spectrum. At one end, one finds
people defined as unemployed (i.e. those currently engaged in active job search) and, at
the other end, one would have those who do not intend ever to look for a job (Gregg
and Wadsworth, 1998). Hence, the analysis of employment performance needs to account
for both unemployment and inactivity determinants. We intend to focus on two crucial
questions. First, we want to know if there exists a trade-oﬀ between unemployment and
inactivity, i.e. some sort of substitution across the diﬀerent situations of non-employment.
If one looks at the evolution of inactivity and unemployment rates for selected countries,
there are indeed cases where a trade-oﬀ emerges, though this is not a general feature of
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our sample (see Appendix 6.3, Figures 1 to 3). A second and connected question would be
to analyse the way the institutional setting aﬀects inactivity: are institutional rigidities
impacting the inactivity rate along the same line as the unemployment rate? Answering
to the latter will allow us to provide some hints about the interconnections across various
situations of non-employment.
2.1 theoretical background
Labour markets imperfections. We take account of imperfections on the labour market
by introducing the following institutional variables: employment protection legislation
(EPL), net replacement rate, wage taxes, union density and wage coordination. There is
a rich literature detailing the positive eﬀects of reducing labour market imperfections (see
Introduction above): lowering EPL, net replacement rates, wage taxes and union density
should lead to a lower real wage schedule and equilibrium unemployment; however, wage
coordination is frequently assumed to enhance employment performance by allowing for
wage moderation (Calmfors and Driﬃll, 1988). However, one should note that a negative
impact of increased labour market flexibility and labour turnover emerges in a few papers.
Snower and Diaz-Vazquez [1996] model an economy characterized by perfect competition
and wage bargaining, where stronger turnover can lower employment if fluctuations are
transient and union power moderate. Fella [2000] shows that redundancy pay may improve
welfare by reducing the suboptimally high rate of turnover determined by individual
firms in the presence of intertemporal externalities. Amable and Gatti [2006] extend this
analysis to an economy with imperfect competition on product markets (see below).
Product markets imperfections. We consider the OECD index of global product market
regulation (PMR). Nickell [1999] argues that product market deregulation should shift
out firms labour demand curve and/or favour the entry of new firms. The benefits of
increased product market competition also depend on the wage setting process. Because
more competition on the product market makes firms’ labour demand more sensitive to
the real wage, the negative impact on both employment and profits of any increase in
wages is larger. This reduces unions’ claims and the bargained level of the real wage.
Hence, unionized firms which face increased competition will benefit from a higher labour
demand and a lower bargained real wage schedule. Amable and Gatti [2004] develop a
dynamic eﬃciency wage framework with imperfect competition on goods market. The
authors show that an increase in product market competition boosts labour turnover and
reduces job security. As a consequence, the eﬃciency wage schedule compatible with more
intense product market competition shifts upward: this mechanism pushes real wages up
to the point that increased competition may generate employment losses.
Interaction across labour and product markets imperfections. We consider possible
interactions across PMR and EPL regulations, as well as interactions across EPL and
replacement rate. The latter aims to account for possible complementarites across struc-
tural reforms on the labour market (Orszag and Snower, 1999; Saint Paul, 2003). Con-
cerning the former, Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] show that increased product market
competition may have short-term costs, such as decreasing rents and wages; labour mar-
ket deregulation, by lowering rents, reduces incentives to fight for capturing them and
eases the implementation of deregulation policies in the product market, and vice versa.
Koeniger and Vindigni [2003] submit that free entry makes it more diﬃcult for firms to
bear the costs associated with an ”inflexible” labour market; due to the positive eﬀect
of increased product market competition on employment, incentives to protect jobs are
reduced. Amable and Gatti [2006] show that engaging in a process of product market
deregulation yields an implicit labour market reform leading to a more intense turnover
on the labour market. This mechanism is exacerbated by increased competition on the
product market but is dampened by redundancy payments. Hence, policies increasing
job security may be necessary to oﬀset the possible detrimental eﬀects of a more intense
labour turnover. In same cases, a complementarity may emerge between regulations in
product and labour markets, both interacting to ensure more stable labour relations; in
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other cases, product market deregulation and labour market regulation become substitute
policies which means that joint deregulation policies have conflicting eﬀects on aggregate
employment.
Financial markets imperfections. We account for imperfections on financial markets
by considering the role of credit constraints (variable ’credit to the economy’) and finan-
cialisation (variable ’financial assets’). Concerning the impact of financial markets on
employment, Wasmer and Weil [2004] consider a macroeconomic model where imperfec-
tions on both labour and credit markets interact. Imperfections rely on informational and
search frictions and are modelled with the help of matching functions. Entrepreneurs must
find credit before setting up a firm, and they must find workers before producing. Credit
market imperfections delay the setting up of the firm and make it more expensive, which
ultimately depresses labour demand and contributes to raising the unemployment rate
above the level which would have resulted from the existence of labour market imperfec-
tions alone. A similar interaction between imperfections in credit and labour markets may
also be found in Acemoglu [2001]. Credit market frictions hinder investment and lower
the economy’s capital stock, which leads to a lower employment level if labour and capital
are complementary or if labour market imperfections make the real wage downward-rigid.
Thesmar and Thoenig [2004] propose a model where financial market development, by
improving risk sharing between firms owners, increases the willingness of these firms to
take risky bets. This in turn increases firm level uncertainty in employment and profits.
Amable, Ernst and Palombarini [2005] propose a model of institutional complementarities
where trade unions and firms have the choice between a cooperative negotiation targeting
at the long-term success of the firm and a conflictual relation targeting at maximizing
the current share. One important determinant in this game is the time horizon financial
investors have as they influence the realization of future gains of cooperation between
workers and firms. When financial investors are patient, a pareto-superior cooperative
equilibrium can be attained. On the other hand, whenever one of the two bargaining par-
ties gets too weak, the viability even of the long-term equilibrium is threatened. We try to
capture the eﬀects of uncertainty and investors time horizon through our ’financialisation’
variable.
Central Bank Independence. A traditional channel through which Central Bank In-
dependence (CBI) might aﬀect unemployment is a sort of Phillips curve mechanism: a
more independent central bank would go along with a greater focus on price modera-
tion and a less accommodating monetary policy (i.e. more ’conservatism’), thus yielding
higher unemployment in the medium term. In the presence of nominal rigidities and eco-
nomic business cycles, a trade-oﬀ emerges between conservatism (which reduces inflation)
and flexibility to respond to exogenous shocks -which reduces employment variability
(Svensson, 1996). Recent papers focus on the impact of central bank conservatism on
equilibrium unemployment. Soskice and Iversen [2000] show that, if the central bank is
non-accommodating, suﬃciently large unions, bargaining independently, have an incen-
tive to moderate sectoral money wages, and thereby expected real wages. The result is
an increase in the real money supply, and hence higher demand and employment. Lippi
[2003] shows that if wage setters are non-atomistic, more conservatism may either increase
or decrease equilibrium unemployment, depending on certain structural features of the
economy. Intuitively, a large union understands that an increase in its own nominal wages,
taking as given the nominal wages of the other unions, leads to an increase in inflation
and hence to a reduction in the other unions’ real wages. This reduction makes the other
unions’ labor cheaper (triggering labor substitution) and changes the economy’s overall
production. Both eﬀects influence the labor demand faced by the union and, therefore,
its employment choices. Crucially, conservatism determines the magnitude of both eﬀects
(as perceived by an individual union) since it aﬀects the inflation eﬀect of a given nominal
wage rise. The eﬀect of more conservatism on employment is negative if the ‘substitution’
eﬀect dominates the ‘output’ eﬀect.
Macroeconomic determinants. We use a set of macroeconomic control variables: money
supply (the OECD ’credit to the economy’ time series and long-run real interest rate),
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competitiveness (real exchange rate and structural trade balance), and average labour
productivity. An increase in credit supply eases credit constraints and yields improved
employment conditions. The eﬀect of competitiveness can in principle go both ways: in-
creased competitiveness (i.e. higher real exchange rate and improved trade balance) could
enhance employment performance by boosting international demand for national goods;
moreover, inflationary pressure in the home country are dampened by an increase in real
exchange rate, yielding wage moderation and a positive impact on employment. However,
increased competitiveness requires national price moderation while national authorities
(governments and central bank) who are concerned with improving medium term employ-
ment might be tempted to use expansionary policies to serve domestic objectives instead
of external balance constraints. In this case, an improved employment performance in
the medium term could go along with a decrease in the trade balance (Carlin and Sos-
kice, 2005). Finally, increased labour productivity should improve labour demand and
employment. It should be mentioned that one could expect macroeconomic controls to
act diﬀerently on unemployment and inactivity. In fact, increased competitiveness and
average productivity could lead to the exclusion of low skilled workers likely to fall into
inactivity.
2.2 database and variables
Our sample spans over the period 1980 to 2004 (although many data are missing after
2000) and includes 18 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States. A complete list of dependent and independent variables
used in our estimations is provided below. More comments about specific indicators that
are used in estimations (i.e. the EPL variable and the Central Bank independence score)
are also provided. Note that the real interest rate is not included below because it turned
out to be non significant in all estimations.
Dependent variables
unemployment rate ratio of unemployed to working age population
inactivity rate ratio of inactive working age pop. to total working age pop.
jobless rate unemployment rate plus inactivity rate
Independent variables
EPL (0-3) Employment Protection Legislation (based on own calculations)
PMR (0-6) indicator of Product Market Regulation (OCDE)
RR net replacement rates on unemployment insurance (Scruggs, 2004)
COOR (0-3) index of coordination in wage bargaining (Nickell et al., 2005)
UD union density, ratio of total reported union members (OECD)
TW tax wedge, various specifications (OECD)
FA ratio of total financial assets of institutional investors to GDP (OECD)
EDUC students enrolled in primary plus secondary educ. to total enrolled students (OECD)
CBI (1-3) central bank independence (based on Freitag, 1999; 1=total indep.)
RER first time diﬀerence of the real exchange rate (OECD)
Productivity one period lag of log real GDP — log employment (OECD)
Inflation rate of growth of consumer price index (OECD)
Credit ratio of domestic credit to GDP (OECD)
TTB based on the Hodrick-Prescott trend of trade balance (OECD)
LDU long duration unemployment (OECD)
JVR vacancy rate (OECD)
Employment Protection Legislation
There are few variables representing employment protection legislation (EPL) that are
available for empirical work. The OECD have devised an EPL indicators that is available
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for three dates: end of the 1980s, end of the 1990s and 2003. Blanchard and Wolfers
[2000] propose an EPL measure based on the OECD indicator, then available for two
dates only. They interpolated between the OECD’s late 1980s and late 1990s scores for
the 1990-1994 period and used the late 1980s figures for the whole 1980 decade. From
the two data points proposed by the OECD, they created four five-year averages. On this
basis, Nickell et al. [2002] created annual data points for 1980-1995. These cross-section
time series measures of EPL are also used by the IMF study and by Baker et al. [2005]
and Baccaro and Rei [2005]. We propose an annual measure of EPL that we constructed
by taking the indicators above as a starting point. In addition to them, we considered the
FRDB Social Reforms Database3, which collects, on an annual basis, information about
social reforms in European countries over the period 1987-2005 in the areas of employment
protection legislation, pension systems, unemployment/non-employment benefits and mi-
gration policies. Using the information provided in the database on the reforms aﬀecting
EPL, we estimated a model explaining the evolution of the EPL indicator of Nickell et
al. [2002] with the various indicators about employment protection given in the FRDB
Social Reforms Database and time trends as regressors.4 This model was used to predict
a series for EPL between 1980 and 2004. In order to check the relevance of the predicted
EPL series, we compared the evolutions of our new indicator with Nickell et al. [2002]
indicator as well as with the three data points given by the OECD. In order to avoid major
discrepancies between our own series and the OECD scores, we modified accordingly the
specification of the estimation model by modifying the inclusion of time trends according
to countries and ultimately changing a few values of the series directly. We thus obtained
a cross-section time series indicator of employment protection legislation for 18 countries
over the 1980-2004 period. The evolution of our EPL indicator for few countries on our
sample is documented in Appendix 6.3 (Figures 4 to 6).
Central Bank Independence
This indicator is based on Freitag [1999] and commented by Armingeon et al. [2005].
It is a composite index constructed out of four other indicators, each of them has been
divided in a category above and one under the median: 1) "bankales", by Alesina [1988],
which ranges from 1 to 4, the higher, the more independent; this index considers whether
the central bank has final authority over monetary policy, whether government oﬃcials
sit on the governing board of the bank, and whether more than half of the members are
appointed by the government; 2) "bankeﬀ", index proposed by Eijﬃnger and Schaling
[1996], which ranges from 1 to 5, the higher, the more independent; it is based on the
location of final responsibility for monetary policy, the absence or presence of government
oﬃcial on the board of central bank, and the percentage of board appointees made by the
government; 3) "bankgr_2", index proposed by Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini [1991],
measuring only political independence, from 0 to 8, the higher, the more independent;
focuses on appointment procedures for board members, the length of members’ terms to
oﬃce, and the existence of the statutory requirement to pursue monetary stability; 4)
"bankcuk", unweighted legal-independence index by Cukierman [1994], aggregated from
sixteen legal characteristics of central-bank charters grouped into four clusters: the ap-
pointment, dismissal, and legal term of oﬃce of the governor of the central bank; the
institutional location of the final authority for monetary policy and the procedures for the
resolution of conflicts between the government and the central bank; the importance of
price stability in comparison to other objectives; and the stringency and universality of
limitations on the ability of the government to borrow from the central bank; the index
ranges from 0 to 1. Given the four indexes above, the composite index of CBI that we use
goes from 1 to 3, where ‘1’ stands for a maximum of central bank independence (when all
four indexes agree, that the central bank of this country is independent) and ’3’ stands for
3The FRDB Social Reforms Database has been developed by Giacomo Degiorgi, Elisabetta Fron-
tini, Serena Fumagalli, Francesco Legrenzi, Mauro Maggioni and Francesca Mazzolari at the Fondazione
Rodolfo Debenedetti. The Database is available at: http://www.frdb.org
4For countries not documented in the FRDB Social Reforms Database, we used only time trends and
the three OECD scores.
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a maximum of central bank dependence. The index has been changed in some countries
due to reforms and changes in law: Austria (1985f), New Zealand (1990f) Canada (1991f),
France, Finland, United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium (1993f). Two examples of the
evolution of the indicator are given in the Appendix 6.3 (Figure 7).
2.3 methodology
Testing hypotheses regarding unemployment, inactivity and jobless rates involves certain
problems related with the use of Time Series-Cross Section (TSCS) data. Let yi,t be the
observation for the time series y at time t for unit i. Let xi,t be the observations for a
vector of independent variables. The problem is usually of the following form:
yi,t = α+ β · xi,t + i,t (1)
i,t is the error term. The consideration of a pooled data model, compared to either
a country-specific times series model or a pure cross section, is usually imposed by the
size of the sample. Most comparative analyses deal with a limited number of countries
(small N) for a not too large number of periods (small N). In this respect, one usually
distinguishes TSCS data from the panels found in microeconomic applied analysis, which
are characterised by a large N- (very) small T data structure. This is also why a literature
has grown emphasizing that the estimators fit for panel data may pose some problems
when applied to TSCS data. With respect to the latter, Beck and Katz [1995] and
[1996] have become the most influential references and their "panel corrected standard
errors" (PCSE) estimator is widely used in comparative political economy. This estimator
is basically applying the OLS with modified standard errors to take account of panel
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of the error terms.
The first issue raised by the consideration of a model such as 1 is how relevant it is to
pool data. A fully unpooled model would consider specific βi for each unit. A partially
pooled model would consider several βjs applying to as many subset of countries. When
the time dimension allows for it, it is usually better to consider an unpooled model, but
as mentioned before, the size of the samples considered in comparative analyses mostly
forbid such a strategy. Besides, Beck and Katz [2001] show that the traditional F test
for pooling too often rejects pooling and that alternative methods related to the use of
a random coeﬃcient model do not solve the problem of partial pooling. The conclusion
stated by Beck and Katz [2004] is therefore that ’the gains from pooling oﬀset the costs
of pooling more than standard statistical theory asserts’.
A simple way to deal with country heterogeneity is to include fixed eﬀects and to
consider the following model:
yi,t = αi + β · xi,t + i,t (2)
Estimating a fixed eﬀect model amounts to relating intra-unit changes in y to intra-unit
changes in x, without addressing the problem of the relation between the average y and
the average x across countries. All cross country variance is absorbed by the fixed eﬀects.
This feature has made many comparative analysts uncomfortable with the use of such a
model since no explanation of what fixed eﬀects stand for can be given. The inclusion
of country fixed eﬀects also preclude the inclusion of time-invariant or slowly-changing
variables as independent variables. Several of the variables we consider in what follows
are either invariant (at least for a non negligible part of the period considered) or change
slowly. Distinguishing between their influence on unemployment, inactivity or joblessness
and the influence of omitted country-specific variables will thus prove diﬃcult. If one does
not include fixed eﬀects in the model, the time-invariant variables will carry the weight
of all the country specific factors determining employment and unemployment.
The question of whether fixed eﬀects should be included in TSCS models or not arises
in most comparative empirical studies. It is possible to test for the inclusion of such eﬀects.
However, Beck and Katz [2004] state that F test for the significance of fixed eﬀects may
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be too liberal in rejecting the null of no eﬀects. Rejection is more likely in the presence
of many units since a few of the fixed eﬀects are likely to be significant. They suggest to
include fixed eﬀects when they are large and clearly significant. In this case as in others,
there is no preset formula, but problems related to the omission of fixed eﬀects are in
many cases likely to be greater than those related to their inclusion (Plümper, Tröger and
Manow [2005]).
Plümper and Tröger [2004] propose a procedure for analysing the eﬀect of time-
invariant variables in a model including fixed eﬀects. Their procedure takes three steps:
(i) estimate a fixed-eﬀects model (ii) regress the unit eﬀects on the time-invariant vari-
ables (iii) re-estimate the first stage including the error term of the second stage (xtfevd
procedure).
Their Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the fixed eﬀect vector decomposition
(xtfevd) estimator is the least biased estimator when time-variant and time-invariant
variables are correlated with the unit eﬀects. When unit eﬀects are uncorrelated with the
time-variant variables, pooled OLS, random eﬀects (RE) and fixed eﬀects vector decom-
position (FEVD) estimators give unbiased estimates whereas the Hausman-Taylor (HT)
estimator gives biased estimates. When unit eﬀects are correlated with the time-variant
variables, pooled OLS and RE models perform poorly; FEVD and HT are unbiased, HT
being less eﬃcient. When unit eﬀects are correlated with time-invariant variables, all pro-
cedures are equally biased, but HT is the less eﬃcient. When unit eﬀects are correlated
with both time-variant and time invariant variables, FEVD is the most eﬃcient and the
least-biased estimator. FEVD is slightly worse than RE when time-variant variables are
uncorrelated with the unit eﬀects, time-invariant are correlated with the unit eﬀects and
the distribution of the unit eﬀects is slightly skewed.
Another problem related to the use of TSCS data concerns serial correlation. Beck
and Katz [1995] have advocated the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the
regression to deal with this problem, and consider the lagged dependent (LDV) variable
model with dummies which has the following form:
yi,t = αi + φ · yi,t−1 + β · xi,t + i,t (3)
It is well known that the least square estimator with dummies (LSDV) including a lagged
dependent variable gives biased estimates. The usual approach with panel data is to use
an instrumental variables (IV) estimator (Anderson and Hsiao [1982], Arellano and Bond
[1991]). Kiviet [1995] takes a diﬀerent approach. The LSDV estimator may biased but
has often a smaller mean squared error than IV estimators. It is then better to estimate
the bias and correct the estimation accordingly. This procedure may sometimes prove
superior to the IV estimators but is somewhat heavy to implement. Besides, Beck and
Katz [2004] show with the help of Monte Carlo simulations that in the case of TSCS data,
i.e. with values of T greater than 10, 20 or even 30, the proposed fixes (Kiviet correction
or IV methods) are not worth their costs.
3 Empirical results
In this Section, we first present an overview of our estimation strategy: the specification
of our basic model and possible variations, a well as a presentation of robustness tests and
estimators that we use. We then present results obtained with a PCSE estimator (and
alternatively a GLS estimator). Finally, we pass on to results obtained with a FEVD
estimator.
The general specification of our model follows (3). As in Nickel et al. [2005] we
estimate the model based on annual data and include the lagged dependant variable
(LDV) to account for persistence and hysteresis eﬀects. Our basic model includes main
institutional arrangements in the labour market, also considered by Nickel et al. [2005]:
EPL, unemployment benefit replacement rate, union density, the tax wedge, and wage
coordination. We consider a few additional variables as the ratio of financial assets to GDP,
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product market regulation, and central bank independence. Our main macroeconomic
controls are the ratio of credit to the economy to GDP, the first time diﬀerence of the
real exchange rate and the lagged level of productivity. We include few interaction terms,
especially involving EPL - which we interact with replacement rates and PMR. This allow
us to determine wether the impact of employment protection is high when it is associated
with another institutional rigidity. Finally, we introduce the trend of trade balance in order
to distinguish two diﬀerent channels of influence of the external balance constraint: a price
channel (i.e. via the real exchange rate) and a ’price and volume’ channel (i.e. via foreign
demand). In addition to the previously mentioned variables, the specifications include
a number of almost time-invariant variables such as PMR, Central Bank independence
and the index of coordination We use annual data for each of these variables. As in
IMF (2003) and Nickel et al. (2001), the insertion of a lagged dependent variable is
supposed to take into account the hysteresis stemming from agents’ current position on
the labor market (unemployment, inactivity and joblessness). The introduction of a lagged
dependent variable is a corollary of the use of annual data: the labor market is unable
to absorb exogenous shocks in one period, and the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent
variable captures the speed of this adjustment process. We include in each regression
country and time dummies. This allows us to control both for shocks that are common
to all country (time dummies) and specific to one country (country dummies). As argued
in Section 2.3, the inclusion of country dummies (i.e. fixed eﬀects) is a sensible issue,
especially in relation with the introduction of time invariant variables whose estimated
coeﬃcient are sensitive to inclusion/exclusion of those dummies.
We begin our analysis by testing the order of integration of our series. We apply several
panel unit root tests: Im, Pesaran and Shin [2003], Maddala and Wu [1999] and Levin, Lin
and Chu [2002] with diﬀerent specifications (with or without trends, with or without drift).
The results are given in Appendix 6.2. Most series appear stationary (sometimes with a
drift or a time trend) with the exception of financial assets and possibly union density.
Therefore, we will include financial assets and union density in our regressions in levels
but also, alternatively, in first diﬀerences. Results with first diﬀerence will be presented
directly for PCSE, and separately in Section 3.3.4 for FEVD estimations. Since we work
with annual data, we take further precautions and test the stationarity of residuals from
our regressions in the same way as above. The tests show that all residuals are stationary.
We also check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of residuals, by using the
tests proposed by Nickell et al. [2005]. For regressions concerning jobless and unemploy-
ment rates we can not reject the assumption of autocorellation and heteroskedasticity of
residuals. Autocorellation is generally not a problem for regressions explaining inactivity
though residuals are still heteroskedastic. We correct for these problems in the following
ways. Concerning autocorrelation of residuals, we assume either, as advocated by Beck
and Katz [1995], a "common rho" for all countries (first order autocorrelation coeﬃcient),
the value of which is presented in each table, or we introduce a panel specific rho , as in
Nickell et al. [2005]. The two procedures give very similar results as tables below will
show. Moreover, we take care of heteroskedasticity by adopting a "robust" standard error
estimator whenever possible. For all specifications of our model, we consider three diﬀer-
ent estimators : GLS, PCSE and FEVD. As argued in the previous Section, we consider
that FEVD is a better suited estimator in the presence of invariant time series.5 Nev-
ertheless, in order to check for robustness of the results, we present regressions obtained
with all estimators mentioned above.
3.1 regressions with PCSE
We start the empirical analysis by estimating our model with a standard OLS/PCSE
estimator, or alternatively a GLS estimator. Results are displayed and commented below.
5One should also note that PCSE is sometimes considered as a better estimator than GLS which can
not eliminate serial correlation and might overestimate the significance of coeﬃcients (see for instance
Bacaro and Rei, 2005).
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3.1.1 unemployment
Table 1 displays the results for unemployment obtained with an OLS/PCSE estimator.
As they are similar to those obtained with GLS, these are presented in Appendix 6.1
(table A1).
Regression 1 presents the results for our basic model. It shows a coeﬃcient for the
lagged unemployment rate that is significant and rather high (around 0.75-0.8), which
points to a high level of unemployment persistence. This will actually be the case in
all regressions for the unemployment rate. A few labour market institutions variable
appear significant in this first regression, with coeﬃcients having the standard expected
signs. PMR turns out to have a positive impact on unemployment, this supporting the
standard view about the beneficial role of product market deregulation. However, the
coeﬃcients of some institutional variables, such as EPL, the replacement rate, coordina-
tion or CBI, are not statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising given that
some of those variables (particularly CBI and COOR) are time invariant; the presence of
country dummies makes PCSE a weak estimator for this kind of variables. Concerning
our macro variables the mains results are the following. The terms of trade variable has
a significantly negative coeﬃcient, which is a standard result in the literature (Nickell
et al., 2005). One can interpret this coeﬃcient as the result of the beneficial eﬀect on
unemployment stemming from increased competitiveness, or as the consequence of a high
exchange rate on wage moderation. We will try to distinguish between these two eﬀects
later on by directly introducing trade balance in the regression. The productivity term
has a significantly negative coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as a positive technology
shock pushing labour demand upwards. The credit variable also has a significantly nega-
tive coeﬃcient, in accordance with the hypothesis that relaxing credit constraints allows
firms to expand production by hiring more labour. Regression 2 presents results when one
substitutes first diﬀerences of union density and financial assets to levels of these variables.
A notable diﬀerence is that EPL shows up significant with a negative coeﬃcient. This
eﬀect is at odds with the standard view that increased EPL yields higher unemployment.
The variable for financialisation now appears significantly related to unemployment. An
increase in the degree of financialisation of the economy yields an increase in the rate
of unemployment. This eﬀect is clearly distinct from that of the credit variable. The
latter has an interpretation along the lines of the mechanisms featured in Wasmer and
Weil [2004] or Acemoglu [2001]. The financial assets variable has a diﬀerent interpreta-
tion. An increase in financialisation is associated with a change in agents time horizon
which may lead to industrial restructuring implying layoﬀs. Regressions 3 and 4 include
the interaction term between the replacement rate and employment protection legislation.
Substituting the interaction variable to EPL makes both RR and the interaction variable
significant. The replacement rate has a positive impact on unemployment whereas EPL
interacted with the RR has a significant negative impact on unemployment. This result
confirms the positive role played by EPL fostering employment performance. The other
coeﬃcients are similar to those in regressions 1 and 2.
12
Table 1. Unemployment
1 2 3 4
lag unemployment .7636835*** .8018459*** .7545725*** .7882633***
PMR 2.463291*** 2.539273*** 2.362411*** 2.471646***
EPL -.5667357 -1.161745***
EPL*RR -1.136782** -1.767929***
RR .5552765 .6530452 2.240818* 3.25797***
COOR -.3654997 -.360539* -.3121234 -.2823028
CBI -.0576579 -.1181046 -.0673883 -.1256982
UD .0497868*** .0442059***
d_UD .1279503*** .1255831***
TW .0457226** .0178906 .0422956* .0151323
FA .0046051 .0040074
d_FA .0118947** .0126417**
RER -1.416496*** -1.286505** -1.445319*** -1.239464**
Productivity (lag) -5.058651*** -3.817861*** -5.110538*** -3.833319***
Credit -.0442347*** -.0379556*** -.0447262*** -.038874***
Estimator PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE
time and country dummies y y y y
panel specific AR1 y y y y
robust y y y y
Number obs. 232 226 232 226
3.1.2 inactivity
Results for the inactivity rate are found in Table 2. The specification of regressions 1
and 2 are in accordance with those displayed for unemployment. They correspond to the
basic model and the model in diﬀerence for union density and finance estimated with
PCSE. Moreover, we include consumer price variation in the second regression. Results
show a high coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent variable. This is not surprising given
that part of the inactive population includes people who are definitely out of the labor
force. However, the sensitivity of inactivity to institutional and macro variables highlights
the fact that an important portion of inactive population is actually quite close to the
labor market, as suggested by authors like Gregg and Wadsworth [1998]. Concerning
macroeconomic variables, credit to the economy and real exchange rate are both negatively
correlated with inactivity, which reflects the influence of good macroeconomic conditions
on activity. Turning to institutional variables, in both regressions EPL is significantly
negatively related to inactivity, while RR and union density (either in level or in diﬀerence)
are positively related. In the first regression, Central Bank independence, PMR and
financial assets variables all have statistically significant positive coeﬃcients. Nevertheless,
the last result is dubious considering that the financial series is almost certainly non
stationary. When the model’s specification is modified (regression 2), the significance of
PMR and Finance coeﬃcients vanishes. In regressions 3 and 4, we present results with a
GLS estimator. These are similar to those previously obtained with PCSE.
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Table 2. Inactivity
1 2 3 4
lag inactivity .8414101*** .8676585*** .8070652*** .8355943***
PMR 1.564968** .8364729 .6844675 .2693281
EPL -.6803178* -1.032364*** -.910344*** -1.336465***
RR 1.523406** 1.431488* 1.48453*** 1.307604**
COOR -.3542501 -.1404765 -.1463045 -.1412095
CBI .2015188* .0932693 .1254675 .1118876
UD .0356054** .0381515***
d_UD .1117847** .0885497**
TW .019224 -.0442486** -.0378283** -.0574878***
FA .0097232*** .0084001***
d_FA .0043145 .0044488
RER -1.974592*** -1.708829*** -1.041635*** -1.091949***
Productivity (lag) 1.177893
Inflation -.0654418 -.1051478*** -.1138911***
Credit -.0346726*** -.0313935*** -.0286229*** -.0273619***
Estimator PCSE PCSE GLS GLS
time and country dummies y y y y
panel specific AR1 n y n y
robust y y y y
Number obs. 232 226 232 226
3.1.3 joblessness
Table 3 presents results for the jobless rate based on PCSE estimator (results with GLS
are found in Appendix 6.1, table A2). Results are basically in line with those of the
previous two tables. As before, the first two columns refer respectively to regressions in
levels and diﬀerences (for Financial asset and union density). In the third regression, we
apply panel specific correction for residuals autocorrelation. In the fourth column, we
propose a variation of the model including the interaction term for EPL and PMR. The
main results are the following. Concerning the first three columns, the replacement rate
has no significant eﬀect whereas the coordination variable has a significant negative impact
in three out of four regressions (as for unemployment). The weak impact of Central Bank
variable is confirmed. The significance of the tax rate is dependent on the specification
of the model. Introducing the diﬀerence for union density and financial assets removes
the significance of the tax variable (as for unemployment). One can note that both EPL
and PMR are now highly significant, whereas the latter variable was mainly significant
for unemployment and the former for inactivity. In both case, signs are in accordance
with those in table 1 and 2. In column 4, substituting the interaction term to EPL yields
a result in accordance with a complementarity mechanisms such as the one put forward
by Amable and Gatti (2006). Increased regulation in both product and labour markets is
associated with a better employment performance.
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Table 3. Joblessness
1 2 3 4
lag jobless rate .4804962*** .8478554*** .8141533*** .4878916***
PMR 3.372508** 3.790282*** 3.445991***
EPL -3.707794*** -2.241889*** -2.843671***
EPL*PMR -1.232287***
RR 2.314394 1.83658 2.128872 1.828228
COOR -1.573911*** -.4780409 -.9362384*** -1.514647***
CBI .1498346 .027039 -.1430191 .200488
UD .1804011*** .203967***
d_UD .2994036*** .2629805***
TW .1147237*** .0243538 .0356913 .0855858*
FA .016597** .0167462**
d_FA .0182108** .0177629**
RER -2.742293** -2.992851** -3.250178*** -2.545249**
Inflation -.3814308*** .0018331 -.0222728 -.3883498***
Credit -.1054779*** -.0717003*** -.0702153*** -.0974894***
Estimator PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE
time and country dummies y y y y
AR1 y y panel specific y
rho .1787095 .1509307 .1753568
robust y y y y
Number obs. 238 226 226 238
3.2 regressions with FEVD
We now turn to estimations based on FEVD that allows us have a more satisfactory treat-
ment of the time-invariant or the slowly-changing variables. Among the institutional vari-
ables that we consider, three belong to this category: product market regulation (PMR),
Central Bank independence and coordination. These variables will thus be treated as
time-invariant in the following regressions. Besides, we carefully check how the intro-
duction of time invariant variables changes our results. To do that, we introduce each
variable successively as time invariant (see Appendix 6.1, tables A3 and A4): our results
are not aﬀected throughout the procedure. We present below results from regressions
concerning the basic model (in level) and its extensions with the inclusion of interaction
terms. Results with series in diﬀerence (FA and UD) are found at the end of the Section.
3.2.1 unemployment
Table 4 shows results for the unemployment rate. As one can see, EPL now has a signifi-
cant negative eﬀect, either alone (regression 1) or in interaction with PMR (regression 2)
and the replacement rate (regression 3). RR itself is only significant when the interaction
term is included (as with PCSE). Union density, tax wedge, and trade balance all have
significant positive eﬀects. Credit, real exchange rate and lagged productivity have sig-
nificant negative eﬀects. Since FEVD estimator should allow us to better assess the role
of time invariant variables, it is worth noting that there are indeed important diﬀerences
with respect to results presented in Table 1 for those variables. In fact, the wage coor-
dination variable now has a significant negative influence on unemployment. The same
holds for Central Bank independence. The sign of CBI coeﬃcient will appear very robust
across our regressions. This points to the role of the traditional channel through which
Central Bank Independence (CBI) might aﬀect unemployment: a sort of Phillips curve
mechanism implying that a more independent central bank places a greater focus on price
moderation and a less accommodating monetary policy, thus yielding higher unemploy-
ment in the medium term (see also Svensson, 1996; Lippi, 2003). The sign, significance
and magnitude of the third time-invariant variable (PMR) are basically unaltered with
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respect to those reported in Table 1. One should also note that we control here for trade
balance (variable TTB) and find it to have a positive significant eﬀect on unemployment.
This result is consistent with the idea that the external constraint might in some cases
hamper domestic policies yielding a negative impact on employment. Finally, financial
assets variable turns now to have a significant positive eﬀect on unemployment, confirm-
ing our previous result (in diﬀerence) and implying that increased financialisation of the
economy does not have a positive impact on labor market operation.
Table 4. Unemployment
1 2 3
lag unemployment .6942031*** .6937818*** .6665141***




RR .5452509 .5099105 2.066288***
COOR -2.156524*** -2.317946*** -1.812675***
CBI -.573803*** -.5867212*** -.3366514***
UD .0396125*** .040699*** .0407221***
TW .0532728*** .0524322*** .0746813***
FA .0056632** .0060357*** .0046396**
RER -1.302139* -1.287773* -1.51797**
Productivity (lag) -5.501064*** -5.53044*** -1.600112**
Credit -.0448293*** -.0442707*** -.044485***
TTB .1901479*** .1976669*** .0816768*
eta .8452574*** .8592565*** .8252756***
time dummies and fe y y y
time inv. variables y y y
AR1 y y y
rho .3729823 .3767836 .3979176
robust n n n
Number obs. 212 212 212
3.2.2 inactivity
Turning to estimations concerning the inactivity rate, we find that Central Bank indepen-
dence now has a positive and significant coeﬃcient while coordination has a significant
and negative coeﬃcient. Results concerning EPL and Financial assets, replacement rate,
union density are basically unchanged. Tax wedge is now strongly significant and has the
standard positive coeﬃcient. One should note that the coeﬃcient of lagged productivity is
significantly positive, which means that, contrary to what we observe for unemployment,
an increase in productivity rises the inactivity rate. The mechanism involved possibility
implies that increased productivity goes along with the use of more modern equipment
and up-to-date skills. This process may leave some workers aside, pushing them out of
active labour force altogether rather than making them simply redundant. We will see be-
low whether this eﬀect persists once we control for the educational level of the workforce.
In column 2, we introduce the interaction term between EPL and PMR confirming the
complementarity eﬀect which had been noticed for employment in previous regressions.
Columns 3 and 4 presents further extensions of our model. We first test the influence of
unemployment duration (regression 3). The coeﬃcient turns out to be positive, which can
easily be interpreted as the discouraging impact of long-term unemployment on willing-
ness to look for a job. Second, we introduce jobs supply by including the vacancy rate in
our estimations. This variable is supposed to take into account the possible disconnection
between jobs supply and demand. A greater disconnection would be reflected in a positive
relation between inactivity and JVR (Faggio and Nickell, 2005). As expected, we find that
increased jobs supply contributes to reduce inactivity.
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Table 5. Inactivity
1 2 3 4
lag inactivity .8377464*** .8421342*** .750325*** .8273024***
PMR 3.921606*** 4.133229*** 4.521502*** 3.149622***
EPL -.9122307*** -.7961346*** -.8606133***
EPL*PMR -.3339745***
RR 1.614114*** 1.373754*** 2.622725*** 2.114287***
COOR -.6938919*** -.9706433*** -1.185702*** -.3099849***
CBI -.6499428*** -.6683326*** -.7238181*** -.6809977***
UD .0499687*** .0522966*** .06511*** .0444499***
TW .0325231*** .0290832*** .0359162*** .0202874***
FA .0079617*** .0082769*** .0132509*** .00514***
LDU .0375585***
JVR -.8145289***
RER -2.126245*** -2.120553*** -1.834706*** -1.525553***
Productivity (lag) 2.505305*** 2.355966*** 3.963573*** 2.954254***
Credit -.0352157*** -.0341522*** -.03088*** -.027735***
TTB -.0998912*** -.0844863*** -.1464787*** -.1135978***
eta 1*** 1*** 1*** 1***
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables y y y y
AR1 n n n n
robust y y y y
Number obs. 232 232 184 216
3.2.3 joblessness
Table 6 presents results for the jobless rate. Here again, the use of the FEVD estimator
makes all variables considered as time-invariant significant. Unsurprisingly, PMR has a
very significant positive impact on the jobless rate, whereas both coordination and Cen-
tral Bank independence have very significant negative coeﬃcients. The other coeﬃcients
confirm the findings for unemployment and inactivity: EPL decreases the rate of jobless,
union density increases it and so does financialisation. It is interesting to see that the
lagged productivity term is either significantly positive or non significant, which leads to
suppose that the positive eﬀect on inactivity is counterbalanced by the negative eﬀect on
the rate of unemployment. Besides, it should be noted that whereas tax rate have signifi-
cant impact on inactivity and unemployment, it does not appear to be clearly significant
for joblessness (except in the basic model). As before, in columns 2 and 3 we add an
interaction term respectively between EPL and PMR and between EPL and RR. Results
confirm the complementarity eﬀects between these variables; once again the replacement




lag jobless rate .7922417*** .7940141*** .7757621***




RR 1.249857* 1.083764 3.579948***
COOR -2.470035*** -2.841155*** -2.142346***
CBI -1.339123*** -1.373496*** -1.107865***
UD .078572*** .0812765*** .0781032***
TW .0154431
TW .0257557* .0214023
FA .0137496*** .0146002*** .0125894***
RER -3.121873*** -3.102104*** -3.362119***
Productivity (lag) -4.95807*** -5.115138*** -.9558327
Credit -.0787524*** -.0769784*** -.0765567***
TTB .1286646** .1548805*** .0515035
eta .9496108*** .9546544*** .9514862***
time dummies and fe y y y
time inv. variables y y y
AR1 y y y
rho .197694 .2016567 .2014893
robust n n n
Number obs. 212 212 212
3.2.4 variations
Considering that the two series of financial assets and union density are very likely to
integrated, we re-estimate our model including first diﬀerences for these two variables
and present results in Table 7. As shown in column 1, the estimation of the replacement
rate eﬀect appears more significant in the unemployment regression whereas productivity,
terms of trade, financial assets and CBI appear less significant. In column 2, we include
the interaction term between EPL and PMR and omit real exchange rate (non significant).
CBI and productivity now turn out to be significant. Results are quite similar to those
presented in table 4 (column 2), except for the replacement rate and the financial assets
variables. Results concerning the jobless rate are presented in column 3: the inclusion first
diﬀerence for financial assets makes this variable non significant. Here again productivity
become non significant. Finally, it is worth noting that the inclusion of first diﬀerence of
FA in estimations for inactivity dies not alter our previous results. Hence, the negative
eﬀect of financialisation seems to work particularly through the channel of social exclusion,
leading to people being pushed out of the labor force.
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Table 7. Unemployment, joblessness and inactivity
unemployment 1 unemployment 2 joblessness inactivity
lag dep. variable .7116711*** .7336925*** .8215008*** .7479784***
PMR 1.772759*** 2.583478*** 4.362935*** 2.785884***
EPL -1.092717*** -2.198159*** -1.317095***
EPL*PMR -.4580989***
RR .7944536* .7701987* 1.510554* 2.355744***
COOR -.9068131*** -1.509368*** -.4039416* -.3877047***
CBI -.0114689 -.1733077** -.3723321** -.1725036***
d_UD .1189973*** .1102253*** .2896292*** .1556017***
TW .0097356 .0310142***
TW .0493467*** .0317536***
d_FA .0085474 .0078904 .0135049 .0032071*
LDU .0452637***
RER -.9614067 -2.307911** -1.872704***
Productivity (lag) -.9237302 -4.578548*** -.4147136 4.972413***
Credit -.0381933*** -.0392534*** -.0628818*** -.0315606***
TTB .1542536*** .2497411*** .1478423*** -.0410016***
eta .75017564*** .772681*** .8890494*** 1***
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables y y y y
AR1 y y y n
rho .3932327 .3696085 .2697514
robust n n n y
Number obs. 207 207 207 180
3.2.5 summary of the results
Before turning to analyse a few extensions to our basic model, we provide in table 8 below
a summary of all results from previous FEVD estimations. The results show that insti-
tutional determinants are similar across unemployment and inactivity for total working
age population. We find standard eﬀects for variables such as replacement rate, coordi-
nation, union density, and tax wedge. We find that PMR alone contributes to increases
unemployment, inactivity and joblessness whereas EPL acts in the opposite way. Inter-
estingly enough, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term PMR*EPL is negative implying
that a complementarities exists between the two forms of regulation, which together con-
tribute to enhance employment performance. More independence of the central bank
is not goof for employment, hence a Phillips curve-type eﬀect is at work which counter
the positive eﬀect of independence on union wage moderation. Moreover, financialisa-
tion leads to worse employment performance; this eﬀect is stronger on inactivity. An
increased financialisation yields a change in agents time horizon, which may lead to in-
dustrial restructuring implying layoﬀs. Macroeconomic variables turn out to be crucial
in our regressions: increased productivity is good for employment but not for inactivity:
one interpretation might be that higher productivity pushes aside low skilled workers; the
same type of mechanism holds for trade balance whereas real exchange rate contributes
to better employment performance possibly via wage moderation.
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Table 8. Results: total population
unemployment inactivity joblessness
EPL negative negative negative
PMR positive positive positive
EPL*PMR negative negative negative
replacement rate positive positive positive/NS
coordination negative negative/NS negative
union density positive positive positive
tax wedge positive positive positive/NS
financial assets (∆) positive (NS) positive (pos.) positive (NS)
central bank ind. negative negative negative
∆ real exch. rate negative negative negative
productivity negative positive/negative negative
credit negative negative negative
trade balance positive negative positive/NS
4 Extensions
In this Section we use the FEVD estimator to test two extensions of our basic model : first,
we control for education within our basic framework, second we modify our dependant
variable and consider employment performance for prime age men instead of working
age population. One should note that main results presented below still hold with other
estimators but might be less robust for some of our independent variables.
4.1 role of education
Table 9 presents the results of estimations including the education variable in the model
with financial and union variables expressed in levels and first diﬀerences. Education plays
a role with respect to inactivity and jobless rates. However, the variable is never significant
in unemployment regressions. This confirms that inactivity and unemployment are two
diﬀerent, although close enough, situations. One should note that this result is indirectly
at odds with the standard wisdom: according to this, more flexible labor markets would
be (un)favourable for unskilled (un)employment because they would enable firms to pay
lower wages to less attractive workers (Bicakova, 2005). If that was the case, we should
see, first, a negative impact of education on unemployment and, second, a positive eﬀect of
EPL on unemployment once we control for education. However, what we find here is that
education decreases both joblessness and inactivity but has no eﬀects on unemployment.
Moreover, EPL’s coeﬃcient remains negative for both dependent variables. Hence, our
results are more consistent with the idea that less educated people are stepping out of the
labor market and that protection may be a way to maintain them in the labor force. In
the same line, it is interesting to note that the inclusion of the education variable makes
the coeﬃcient of the lagged productivity term negative in the regression for inactivity.
Our previous hypothesis concerning the eﬀect of productivity on inactivity is somewhat
comforted: positive productivity shocks lead to higher inactivity by pushing low skilled
out of the labour force; however, increased productivity tends to decrease inactivity once
the level of education of the workforce is controlled for, because more educated workers
are able to adapt to productivity-enhancing technological change.
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Table 9. Role of education
joblessness1 joblessness2 inactivity1 inactivity2
lag dep. variable .6884484*** .7159852*** .8398527*** .690953***
PMR 8.936293*** 5.381737*** 4.153609*** 3.640638***
EPL -1.226631*** -1.947582*** -.9125961*** -1.61386***
RR -.6086597 -1.297138 -.0391062 .1401394**
COOR -3.090864*** -.8890789*** -.501797*** .0050574
CBI -1.239435*** -.1955732 -.4653669*** -.1504927***
UD .0718399*** .044082***
d_UD .3937268*** .2075403***
TW .0696845*** .0695044*** .0550541*** .0655474***
FA .0196817*** .0117785***
d_FA .0125496 -.0019331*
lag EDUC -.0927176*** -.051857*** -.0887628*** -.1179373***
RER -3.111329*** -3.365676*** -1.880565*** -1.881187***
LDU .0419351***
Productivity (lag) -13.98717** -5.396729*** -1.40399***
Credit -.0732292*** -.0590463*** -.0294443*** -.0182203***
TTB .1526052*** .119586* -.1786624*** -.2081411***
Inflation -.1951608*** -.2158188***
eta 1.010256*** .9941394*** 1*** 1***
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables y y y y
AR1 y y n n
rho .2310843 .3144867
robust n n y y
Number obs. 163 159 181 147
4.2 disaggregating inactivity and unemployment
Previous results about the role of education suggest that the impact of institutional vari-
ables may be diﬀerent once taken into account population heterogeneity (i.e. diﬀerences
in educational attainments). An alternative way to account for the heterogeneity of work-
ing age population is to disaggregate it according to age groups. In this Section, we
consider the determinants of employment performance for the male population aged 25
to 54. In fact, as argued in the Introduction, there are some interesting stylised facts
concerning prime age men (PAM) suggesting that more flexible market regulations might
discourage workers (and incite them to become inactive) whereas more protective labor
markets would reveal more ’suitable’ to keep workers away from inactivity. We investigate
the issue by analysing the determinants of unemployment, inactivity and joblessness for
PAM, as measured by the proportion of unemployed, inactive workers and jobless workers
among the male population aged 25 to 54.
Table 10 reports results for unemployment and joblessness of PAM in a model where
financial assets and union density variables are included in levels and first diﬀerences.
Results are similar to those presented in tables 4 and 6 (column 1) above, with the
exception of the replacement rate which appears less significant, particularly for the model
including diﬀerences of FA and UD. Moreover, it should be noted that sign of PMR
coeﬃcient in the regression explaining the jobless rate becomes negative once we substitute
first diﬀerences to levels of FA and UD: the negative eﬀect of PMR on inactivity (see below)
appears to dominate the positive eﬀect of PMR on unemployment.
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Table 10. Unemployment and joblessness: male pop. 25-54
unemployment1 unemployment2 joblessness1 joblessness2
lag dep. variable .6535477*** .6459099*** .618254*** .6259387***
PMR 3.934343*** 1.643035*** 2.412328*** -1.102098**
EPL -1.349419 *** -1.702109*** -1.563517*** -1.799021***
COOR -3.071507*** -1.493533*** -5.103014*** -2.862192***
CBI -1.234359*** -.1106663 -2.360564*** -.7057352***
RR 1.628821 *** 1.396118** 2.372739*** 1.232297
UD .0931111*** .1493283***
d_UD .2154918*** .2141849**
TW .0758094*** .0502258*** .0140859 -.0274577
FA .0065963** .0169142***
d_FA .0129254 .0192601
RER -2.536116 ** -1.601848 -4.142203*** -2.515289*
TTB .2061269*** .309353***
Credit -.0639791*** -.0540974*** -.0682723*** -.0584899***
Productivity (lag) -4.740907 *** -5.775307***
eta .8079197 *** .7892653*** 1.016609*** .8733332***
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables y y y y
AR1 y y y y
rho .2640239 .3158634 .3178648 .3799346
robust n n n n
Number obs. 198 193 198 193
Table 11 shows our results for inactivity. In column 1 we present results for the basic
model. It appears from these results that, when it comes to inactivity, PAM do react
diﬀerently from total working age population. First, the eﬀect of tax wedge on inactivity
rate becomes consistently negative. This confirms the ambiguous impact of taxes on
inactivity: taxation might be an indirect measure of the magnitude of social transfers
which help inactive workers to stay in the labor market and look for a job. Second, PMR
and EPL show now a reverse sign with respect to previous regressions based on working
age population. Labor market protection has a positive impact on the level of inactivity
whereas more regulation on the product market has a negative impact. The former result is
close to the standard view suggesting that job protection contributes to exclude marginal
workers from the labor market, while the latter suggests that product markets deregulation
would primarily harm prime age men, i.e. typical ’insiders’. One possible interpretation
of our results is that typical insiders are protected from unemployment by increased ’EPL
plus PMR’ while those of them who "fall aside" are all the more exposed to inactivity.
In columns 3, we control that changes in the specification of the model do not aﬀect our
results by including unemployment duration. Column 4 presents results based on the
model with diﬀerences for financial and union density variables, and globally confirms our
previous results.
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Table 11. Inactivity: male pop. 25-54
1 2 3 4
lag inactivity 25-54 .7882209*** .7902607*** .7870485*** .8073943***
PMR -.3165353*** -.4723921*** -.3389388*** -1.721934***
EPL .0164859 .2200358** .0386984
EPL*PMR .0797951***
COOR -1.410361*** -1.459226*** -.9741683*** -.3791509***
CBI -.8064093*** -.820254*** -.4422413*** -.1837707***
RR .5524694*** .5357002*** 1.198288*** .2316863**
UD .0765581*** .0776024*** .0767511***
d_UD .0510648
TW -.0203738*** -.0211084*** -.0292401*** -.0612315***
FA .0062784*** .0062084*** .0080637***
d_FA .0122617***
RER -2.10896*** -2.111641*** -1.948382*** -2.076031***
TTB -.2084868*** -.2036989*** -.1788297*** -.0277943**
Productivity (lag) 2.57983*** 2.519966*** 1.167353*** 1.607787***
Inflation -.0847598*** -.0837338*** -.0361636* -.0700768***
LDU .0218854***
eta 1*** 1*** 1*** 1***
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables y y y y
robust y y y y
Number obs. 234 234 195 195
Table 12 below presents a summary of all results for unemployment, joblessness and
inactivity of male population aged 25 to 54.
Table 12. Results: male population 25-54
unemp. 25-54 inact. 25-54 joblessness 25-54
EPL negative positive negative
PMR positive negative positive/negative
replacement rate positive positive positive
coordination negative negative negative
union density positive positive positive
tax wedge positive negative NS
financial assets (∆) positive (NS) positive (pos.) positive (NS)
central bank ind. negative negative negative
∆ real exch. rate negative negative negative
productivity negative positive negative
credit negative negative negative
trade balance positive negative positive
5 Conclusions
This paper has presented regressions explaining employment performance along three dif-
ferent dimensions: unemployment, joblessness and inactivity. Our regressions aimed at
investigating the role of institutional and macroeconomic determinants and their impact
on each of the three dimensions of performance. Main results are as follows. We find
that institutional determinants play, in general, a similar role across unemployment and
inactivity for total working age population. Standard signs are found for the coeﬃcients
of variables such as replacement rate, coordination, union density, and tax wedge. PMR
alone contributes to increase unemployment, inactivity and joblessness whereas, contrary
to common wisdom, EPL acts in the opposite way. It is important to note that the
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coeﬃcient of the interaction term PMR*EPL is negative implying that a complementar-
ities exists between the two forms of regulation, which together contribute to enhance
employment performance. More independence of the central bank is not good for em-
ployment, hence a Phillips curve-type eﬀect is at work which counters any positive eﬀect
of central bank independence on union wage moderation. Moreover, increased financial-
isation leads to worse employment performance; this eﬀect is stronger for inactivity. An
increased financialisation yields a change in agents time horizon, which may lead to in-
dustrial restructuring implying layoﬀs. Macroeconomic variables turn out to be crucial
in our regressions: increased productivity is good for employment but not for inactivity:
one interpretation might be that higher productivity pushes aside low skilled workers; the
same type of mechanism holds for trade balance whereas real exchange rate contributes
to better employment performance possibly via wage moderation.
Our extensions to the basic model yield two main insights. First, education plays an
important role with respect to inactivity and jobless rates whereas the variable is never
significant in unemployment regressions. This confirms that inactivity and unemployment
are two diﬀerent, although close enough, situations. Our results are consistent with the
idea that less educated people are stepping out of the labor market and that job protection
may be a way to maintain them in the labor force. In the same line, it should be noted
that the inclusion of the education variable makes the coeﬃcient of the lagged productivity
term negative in the regression for inactivity: increased productivity tends to decrease
inactivity once the level of education of the workforce is controlled for, suggesting that
more educated workers are able to adapt to productivity-enhancing technological change.
Second, by investigating determinants of employment performance for prime age men, we
found that results for unemployment and joblessness are very similar to those obtained
for total working age population. However, when it comes to inactivity, prime age men do
react diﬀerently from total working age population: PMR and EPL show a reverse sign
with respect to previous regressions. Job protection yields a positive impact on the level of
inactivity whereas more regulation on the product market has a negative coeﬃcient. This
suggests that product markets deregulation primarily hurts prime age men, i.e. typical
’insiders’. One possible interpretation of our results is that typical insiders are protected
from unemployment by increased ’EPL plus PMR’ while those of them who "fall aside"
are all the more exposed to inactivity.
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We present hereafter estimation results with GLS. They are very similar to PCSE esti-
mations. We left out inflation and trend trade bal (not significant).
Table A1. Unemployment
1 2












Productivity (lag) -5.138737*** -3.795812***
Credit -.0439399*** -.0381633***
Estimator GLS GLS
time and country dummies y y
panel specific AR1 y y
robust n n
Number obs. 232 226
Table A2. joblessness
1 2 3 4
lag jobless rate .4866422*** .4793848*** .4337125*** .8483076***
PMR 3.38783 3.670804* 3.77491**
EPL -3.679246*** -4.844235*** -2.247144***
EPL*PMR -1.213092***
RR 1.784014 2.273832 1.968687 1.834081
COOR -1.509104*** -1.569203*** -1.932908*** -.4764982
CBI .2026504 .152373 -.4587436* .0357714
UD .2053613*** .1817612*** .1828047***
d_UD .3008849***
TW .0838275** .1128112*** .1078879*** .0238027
FA .0170337** .016849** .0110394
d_FA .0182737*
RER -2.582857** -2.779362** -3.019062*** -2.99194***
Inflation -.3908095*** -.3851692*** -.3903798*** -.0013268
Credit -.0969443*** -.1049544*** -.1044767*** -.0720737***
Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS
time and country dummies y y y y
AR1 y y panel specific y
rho .1800 .1828 .1480
robust n y y y
Number obs. 238 238 238 226
We provide below results with FEVD and various combinations of time-invariant vari-





















time dummies and fe y y
time inv. variables PMR PMR
AR1 y y
rho .3707546 .3751007








































Table A4. Inactivity and joblessness
inactivity1 inactivity2 joblessness1 joblessness2
lag dep. variable .8505818*** .8315717*** .7886906*** .7892689***
PMR 2.65079*** 3.436564*** 4.648521*** 6.108516***
EPL -.6571522*** -.8367841*** -1.155387*** -1.100015***
RR .7614515*** 1.332246*** 1.003952 1.164018*
COOR -.5539013*** -2.280149***
CBI
UD .0422487*** .0480924*** .0760299*** .0773072***
TW .0105069*** .0217917*** .0197965 .0220337
FA .0062646*** .0062994*** .0135033*** .0132494***
RER -2.114715*** -2.158624*** -3.112332*** -3.129719***
Productivity (lag) 1.851331*** 2.720905*** -4.92511*** -4.857353***
Credit -.0316334*** -.0333909*** -.0766262*** -.0775512***
TTB -.063167*** -.1009371*** .1399267*** .1315534**
eta 1*** 1*** .9327403*** .9455766***
Estimator FEVD FEVD FEVD FEVD
time dummies and fe y y y y
time inv. variables PMR PMR, COOR PMR PMR, COOR
AR1 n n y y
rho .2136607 .2076492
robust y y n n
Number obs. 232 232 212 212
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6.2 unit root tests
Inactivity rate
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
Ipshin 2 -0.327 NS
Ipshin 2 y 0.506 NS
xtfisher 2 29.41 NS
xtfisher 2 y 43.64 NS
xtfisher 2 y 79.49*** I(0)
levinlin 2 -2.63*** I(0)
levinlin 2 y -1.7** I(0)
Unemployment rate
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 -1.667** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 114.1*** I(0)
levinlin 2 y -2.5 I(0)
jobless rate
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 -2.6*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 102.96*** I(0)
levinlin 2 -4.05*** I(0)
Unemployment benefit replacement rate
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 -6.53*** I(0)
levinlin 2 -6.93*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 61.96*** I(0)
Union density
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 0.829 NS
ipshin 2 y 1.02 NS
levinlin 2 -2.76*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 33.7 NS
xtfisher 2 y 17.9 NS
xtfisher pp 2 77.5*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 84.37*** I(0)
Income tax wedge
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 -0.308 NS
ipshin 2 y -0.671 NS
levinlin 2 -1.74** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 56.9** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 112.8*** I(0)
Rate of inactivity for the population aged between 25 and 54
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test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 y -1.0 NS
ipshin 2 0.2 NS
xtfisher 2 54.5** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 113.5*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 y 97.3*** I(0)
ipshin 2 -1.43* I(0)
xtfisher 2 65.9*** I(0)
ipshin 2 -0.867 NS
Financial assets
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
xtfisher 2 y 30.64 NS
xtfisher 2 y 30.78 NS
ipshin 2 1.009 NS
ipshin 2 64.16*** I(0)
RER
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 -5.7*** I(0)
xtfisher 2 99.5*** I(0)
labour productivity (GDP per employed)
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
ipshin 2 2.5 NS
ipshin 2 y 1.35 NS
xtfisher 2 y 72.5*** I(0)
credit_to_economy
lags drift trend stat conclusion
2 36.8 NS
2 y 24.0 NS
2 y 98.5*** I(0)
2 y 1.23 NS
Inflation rate (Inflation)
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
xtfisher 2 89.7*** I(0)
ipshin 2 y -2.51*** I(0)
lag_prim_second_educ_alllevel
test lags drift trend stat conclusion
xtfisher 2 y 86.8*** I(0)
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Figure 7. CBI for France (7) and the US (18)
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